Shanti Bahini Members. Collected photo
Written by: CHT Voice Admin
Recently, Pachgola (Parbatya Chattagram Ganaline)
criticized a piece by UPDF leader Milton Chakma titled "How was the Shanti
Bahini’s Armed Struggle?" While it is natural for people to disagree on
historical interpretations, Pachgola’s attempt to dismiss Milton Chakma’s
analysis as "divisive propaganda" and a "reproduction of
state-sponsored narrative" shows a lack of courage to objectively analyze
history and admit past mistakes.
1. Avoiding Critical Questions
Milton Chakma unequivocally admitted that the Shanti
Bahini achieved significant military success during its early years (the
undivided JSS era). They successfully attacked Bangladesh Army camps and seized
weapons, a fact noted by Indian journalist Subir Bhaumik in his book Insurgent
Crossfire.
This momentum halted when the Bangladesh government
released Santu Larma from jail. Upon his release, Larma ordered an immediate
stop to guerrilla attacks on settlers and the army. This order clearly
benefited the state and harmed the interests of the Jumma people. Milton Chakma
questioned why Larma gave such an order, but Pachgola completely avoided this
point. Had the resistance continued, the demographic "explosion" of
settlers in the CHT might not have reached today's levels. How can Santu Larma
escape this historical accountability?
No one releases their enemy unconditionally out of
mercy. This is especially unimaginable when your enemy's forces are attacking
and devastating you. Ziaur Rahman also took the gamble of releasing Santu Larma
based on political and diplomatic calculations. In this regard, Subir Bhaumik's
comment is noteworthy. In his aforementioned book, he writes: "This (the
release of Santu Larma – admin) was not
just a conciliatory gesture; Zia had clearly calculated the confusion that
Larma’s return would cause in the organiazation, where an alternative
leadership had slowly emerged after his arrest more than four years previously.
His gamble paid off handsomely.” (Subir Bhaumik, Insurgent Crossifre) In other
words, Zia won the gamble he took by releasing Santu Larma."
2. Dictatorial Orders: Seeds of Division
If a directive to temporarily halt attacks had to be
issued for tactical reasons, it is only natural in a democratic process that
such a decision would be made based on discussions within the party. However,
Santu Larma did not follow that method. Furthermore, it was impossible for him
to have a detailed understanding of the many changes that had occurred on the
battlefield during his five years in prison. Yet, without assessing the ground
reality and without any consultation with central leaders, he unilaterally
ordered the cessation of attacks. Such undemocratic, dictatorial, arbitrary,
and fascist behavior cannot help but give birth to division, disunity, and
conflict within the party. And that is exactly what happened in the JSS. This
division within the party eventually spread to the society; in other words, the
society and the nation became divided.
Therefore, it is absolutely undeniable that after
Santu Larma was released from jail and took charge of the Shanti Bahini,
everything in the JSS, the Shanti Bahini, and the movement turned upside down.
On one hand, the party fractured, a civil war began, M.N. Larma lost his life,
and the resistance of the Jumma people was weakened. On the other hand, attacks
on settlers ceased, the government successfully implemented its settler
rehabilitation program by exploiting the civil war, and the army consolidated its
strength and position.
Observing this dictatorial leadership, an Indian
journalist once remarked that Santu Larma was a "divisive figure."
Support for this comment can be found in the writings of JSS leader Tatindra
Lal Chakma. Tatindra Babu writes:
"Deviating from the progressive ideology shown by
M.N. Larma, what this leadership (Santu Larma) has done over the past 29 years
is—instead of drawing in the leadership of the Hill Students' Council (PCP),
which was the result of the party's long hard work—it pushed them away, didn't
even try to keep them neutral, and directly labeled them as enemies.
Consequently, out of the urge for self-preservation, this leadership was forced
to emerge as the UPDF." (Present Condition of M.N. Larma and His
Successors, Probahon).
This autocracy
within the JSS Santu group is now even stronger and more unstoppable.
3) No Explanation for the Decay of Shanti Bahini under
Santu Larma
Milton Chakma described the six and a half years from
1986 to August 10, 1992, as the second phase of the Shanti Bahini's armed
struggle and stated that during this time, the Shanti Bahini failed to build
successful resistance against the Bangladesh Army. Although the Jana Samhati
Samiti (JSS) under Santu Larma’s leadership managed to establish absolute
dominance after the Lamba-Badi civil war, we found no explanation in Pachgola’s
writing as to why they failed to achieve any significant military success during
this period.
While the JSS Santu group's spokesperson lacks this
explanation, we found it in Tatindra Lal Chakma’s writing. In the
aforementioned essay, he writes:
"Immediately after M.N. Larma’s death, his
primary successor (Santu Larma) abolished the post of Political Secretary from
every unit of the Shanti Bahini and dissolved the regional committees
responsible for promoting and spreading progressive thoughts. From then on, the
militant spirit within the Shanti Bahini began to gradually decline. What
followed was even more horrific. Instead of correctly applying revolutionary
policies, M.N. Larma’s successors began applying erroneous ones. Then, in the
name of reorganization, instead of appointing commanders and directors based on
merit, maximum emphasis was placed on loyalty. Within a few days, it became
evident that this loyalty was merely personal loyalty and nepotism. As a
result, those who had never been to war or even thought about fighting were
placed in high positions in the Shanti Bahini. Those who had been working in
the civilian wing were suddenly given responsibilities as Company Commanders,
Sector Commanders, and Command Post Commanders. Consequently, the Shanti
Bahini’s militancy began to suffer 'paralysis'—not by the enemy, but by the
leadership itself."
Though the quote is long, this explanation is vital to
understanding the failure of the Shanti Bahini in its second phase. The
courage, sacrifice, and martyrdom of many ordinary commanders and fighters can
never be denied. The responsibility for the Shanti Bahini’s failure lies not
with them, but with the core leadership. When personal loyalty is the primary
basis for appointing a military commander rather than merit, how can that unit
function or succeed? Santu Larma turned the once "militant" Shanti
Bahini into his private force and rendered it "crippled." Just as a
crippled person cannot walk a long distance, the Shanti Bahini under Santu
Larma could not sustain a long movement and was forced to surrender to the
government out of battle-weariness.
4) If Not "Low-Intensity Warfare," Then
What?
While almost all researchers on the CHT identify the
JSS's armed struggle as Low-Intensity Warfare (LIW), Pachgola refuses to accept
this. To clear up their misconceptions, we cite a few authors: Anurag Chakma
and Haseeb MD. Irfanullah both describe the CHT conflict as a "low
intensity armed conflict." The IWGIA report refers to it as a
"decades-long low intensity guerrilla war." You can find many more
references via internet search or ChatGPT. More importantly, common sense
dictates that the CHT struggle was not high or medium intensity. The Shanti
Bahini under Santu Larma could not even come close to the scale of war
currently being fought by the Arakan Army in Myanmar. Furthermore, his Shanti
Bahini failed to even match the successes of the undivided JSS era. Military
activities in Bandarban were almost non-existent during his time. Yet, during
the undivided JSS period, fighters roamed as far as Dulahazara in Chittagong.
Members of the Bangladesh Army were repeatedly attacked in the Sangu River. A
former Army Chief, who served as an officer in Bandarban at the time, mentioned
in his memoir Shantir Swapne: Shomoyer Smriticharan how they were humiliated
(referring to the "Izzat-er Bash" incident) by Shanti Bahini
fighters.
5) Past Failures: Analysis and Learning, or a
Cover-up?
Pachgola alleges that Milton Chakma tried to belittle
the Jumma people's resistance by calling it "low-intensity warfare."
Milton Chakma was not trying to belittle it; he was trying to find out why the
once-powerful organization failed to conduct the armed struggle correctly. It
is essential for us to know these things for future movements. If we hide our
failures, refuse to analyze them, and are stingy about learning from them, can
we move forward as a nation? One who does not admit their mistakes lacks revolutionary
ideals. We want a discussion on the mistakes of our past movement so we can
learn from them.
6) Forcing a Meeting: Shanti Bahini's Only Success!
Pachgola asks, "How can a struggle that forced the state to the dialogue table and created the foundation for the CHT Accord be a failure?" After much searching, your big discovery is: "Forcing the state to negotiate is a massive success!"
I don't know whether to laugh or cry at this logic.
Anyone with basic political knowledge knows that a government sits for dialogue
with rebels as part of a general, comprehensive strategy. That strategy
involves conducting military, political, psychological, and diplomatic warfare
simultaneously to defeat rebels. Pachgola presents this state strategy as their
own great success. If this is the extent of their political knowledge, no
wonder they crippled the Shanti Bahini! Even if it were a success, it isn't a
big deal. The KNF has already forced the state to the table after a few bank
robberies. What took Santu Babu 10 years, the KNF achieved in less than two.
7) Two More Failures
After Santu Larma took leadership, the guerrilla force
achieved no significant military success. Milton Chakma highlighted both
successes and failures; we add two more:
A) When the Ershad government announced the Hill
District Local Government Council elections on June 25, 1989, the JSS vowed to
stop it militarily. They made big threats, but in the end, it was all bark and
no bite. The Shanti Bahini couldn't cause a single "incident"
militarily. This failure led to deep frustration and desertions.
B) Another failure was creating enmity with smaller,
disadvantaged minorities like the Mro instead of involving them. Due to JSS
leadership errors, the Mro turned against the Shanti Bahini in the 1980s and
formed the "Mro Bahini." The patience and political wisdom required
to bring backward communities into a movement were tragically absent in the
JSS. (See the 4th update of the CHT Commission report Life Is Not Ours). The
Mro were the second-largest group in Bandarban; they supported the Shanti Bahini
initially, but the post-civil war leadership lost that support. When a large
part of your own people goes to the enemy camp, how can you hope to win? It is
said that guerrillas are the fish and the people are the water. If you drain
your own water into the enemy’s field, how will you survive? Was there any
other option but to surrender? Has the JSS ever analyzed these weaknesses? Have
they apologized to the Mro people?
In short, the failure and surrender of the Shanti
Bahini were inevitable—not because of the common commanders and fighters, but
due to the fundamental weaknesses of the leadership. Yet, Pachgola refuses to
analyze these failures and discourages those who want to learn from them.
(January 21, 2026)
For the original article, click here.
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