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| Shanti Bahini Members. Collected photo |
Milton Chakma
Organizer, Dighinala Unit, UPDF
The armed organization of the Jana Samhati Samiti
(JSS), the Shanti Bahini, was formed on January 7, 1973. Until the arrest of
Commander-in-Chief Santu Larma by the police in 1975, this period was the
preparatory phase of the Shanti Bahini’s armed struggle. From 1976 to 1980 was
the first phase of armed warfare. During these four years, Santu Larma was
absent, as he was imprisoned.
During this time, several successful military actions
were carried out, which caused significant disruption to the Bangladesh Army.
In response to Shanti Bahini attacks, the Bangladesh government adopted a
program to rehabilitate Bengali Muslim settlers from the plains into the hill
districts. The Shanti Bahini then began attacking the settlers in order to
thwart this resettlement program. To deal with this situation, Ziaur Rahman, in
a strategically calculated move, released Santu Larma after reaching a secret
understanding with him.
After his release, the first thing Santu Larma did was
to halt attacks on Bengali Muslim settlers. He dissolved the task force led by
Debjyoti Chakma that had been formed to resist the settler rehabilitation
program. As a result, the Bangladesh government gained time and opportunity to
carry out the settler rehabilitation program without obstruction.
Subsequently, from 1982 to 1995, internal splits and
civil war occurred within the JSS–Shanti Bahini. The Priti Group withdrew from
the movement and surrendered to the Bangladesh Army. As a result, the Larma
Group led by Santu Larma was able to establish exclusive dominance throughout
the Chittagong Hill Tracts. If the Badi Group had wished, they too could have
conducted civil war or fratricidal conflict with army support, as Santu Larma
later did. But they did not. They allowed others the opportunity to continue
the movement. However, the Larma Group failed to utilize that opportunity.
From 1986 until August 10, 1992—a period of six and a
half years—was the second phase of the Shanti Bahini’s armed struggle. However,
although the Larma Group became uncontested during this time, it failed to
build any effective armed struggle against the Bangladesh Army. They were
unable to conduct any major military actions. Santu Larma once again revived
the task force that had been formed—and later dissolved—to resist settler
rehabilitation. But by then, much water had flowed down the Chengi–Maini–Kachalong–Sangu–Feni
rivers. Taking advantage of the Larma–Badi civil war within the Shanti Bahini,
the government successfully completed the settler rehabilitation program. The
army also consolidated and strengthened its positions.
When Shanti Bahini members failed to carry out
successful operations against the army, they once again began attacking Bengali
settlers. By then, however, the settlers’ position had become far more
entrenched. In response to Shanti Bahini attacks, the settlers carried out
retaliatory attacks on indigenous villages in collaboration with the army. As a
result, innocent hill people were caught between the two sides and were forced
to flee in fear for their lives, abandoning their homes and lands. The settlers
took advantage of this situation to forcibly occupy all property belonging to
the hill people, including homes and farmland. In this way, indigenous people
were displaced from places such as Pablakhali, Boalkhali, Merung, Langadu,
Bhushanchhara, Ramgarh, Manikchhari, and many other areas, losing all their
lands—none of which have been recovered to this day.
Unable to withstand combat with the Bangladesh Army,
the JSS–Shanti Bahini declared a unilateral ceasefire on August 10, 1992.
Continuous ceasefire followed until the signing of the Chittagong Hill Tracts
Accord on December 2, 1997. The formal dissolution of the Shanti Bahini took
place on February 10, 1998, through surrender.
If the armed struggle of the JSS is analyzed in a
neutral and objective manner, the following conclusions can be drawn:
1. The Shanti Bahini’s armed struggle was a very
low-intensity warfare. In the early phase, during the period of an undivided
JSS, some successful actions were carried out by exploiting the disorganized
condition of the Bangladesh Army. However, in the second phase under Santu
Larma’s leadership, the Shanti Bahini failed to conduct any effective military
operations. Its actions were largely limited to attacks on Bengali settlers.
Errors are evident in decision-making regarding attacks on settlers. When settlers
were initially beginning to establish themselves in the Hill Tracts, attacking
them to derail the government’s rehabilitation plan would have been more
rational. Why Santu Larma instead ordered a halt to such attacks is difficult
to understand.
2. Over the 22 years of armed struggle, the Shanti
Bahini was engaged in armed conflict for only about ten and a half years in
total. The remaining time was spent in fratricidal conflict, fighting with Mizo
insurgents and Sarbahara Party, or under ceasefire. Of this, six and a half
years of armed struggle occurred under Santu Larma’s leadership, while the
remaining four years were fought under the leadership of the undivided JSS.
3. Launching an armed struggle without first
politically educating and organizing the people, and without adequate
preparation, was a major political mistake and an imprudent decision by the
JSS—something that many central leaders of the JSS have privately acknowledged.
4. Because the armed struggle was initiated
prematurely, settler rehabilitation took place. The Shanti Bahini completely
failed to thwart the Bangladesh government’s settler rehabilitation program.
5. Broadly speaking, the armed struggle of the Shanti
Bahini failed. Apart from causing harm to the Jumma people, the JSS’s armed
struggle brought no gains. As a result of the JSS–Shanti Bahini’s armed
struggle, the Jumma people received 400,000 Muslim Bengali settlers—and lost
thousands of acres of land, homes, and village after village.
(January 12, 2026)