By: Sunayan Chakma, Former President, Hill Students’ Council
(PCP)
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1.
On February 15, 1972, shortly after the independence of
Bangladesh, 17 Jumma leaders from various political and social strata of the
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) met the country's first Prime Minister (then
President) Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at his official residence. They submitted a
memorandum with four demands:
a) Autonomy for the
Chittagong Hill Tracts with a provincial legislature,
b) Legal measures in
consistence with the CHT Regulation of 1900,
c) Preservation of
the traditional authority of the Chakma, Mong, and Bohmong kings, and
d) No administrative expansion in the region without the consent of its people.
However, Sheikh Mujib, the same leader whose Awami League party had once demanded autonomy in Pakistan, completely dismissed the hill people’s demands. He said, "All the people of Bangladesh are Bengalis. There is no reason to deny this truth. So forget about autonomy, go home, and become Bengalis."
Between 1972 and 1975, under the leadership of M.N. Larma, preparations were made for both overground and underground movements. This included the formation of a political party called the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) and an armed wing called Shanti Bahini. The PCJSS, under M.N. Larma, won two parliamentary seats in the CHT. Meanwhile, the Shanti Bahini guerrillas began to expand their influence across the region.
On August 15, 1975, Sheikh Mujib and most of his family were brutally assassinated in a military coup. Although a new government was briefly formed under Khondaker Mostaq Ahmed, Major General Ziaur Rahman ascended to power as the military administrator through coups and counter-coups.
As democratic space shrank, PCJSS leaders decided to initiate guerrilla warfare, for which the Shanti Bahini had been prepared. Another factor which contributed to this decision was India’s changing attitude toward the new Bangladesh government after Mujib's assassination.
On August 21, 1975, Santu Larma and Bhobotosh Dewan visited Delhi via Agartala and met with Indian intelligence agency RAW officials. They secured promises for guerrilla training, weapons, and the use of Indian territory. But upon returning on August 30, Santu Larma was arrested by Bangladeshi police from Kukichhara, Khagrachari. This arrest came at a critical juncture—right before the guerrilla war was about to start. His capture exposed the secret plans of India and PCJSS, dealing a serious blow to their preparations. Priti Kumar Chakma, a senior leader, had advised Santu to avoid main roads and travel through the jungle, but Santu ignored the advice. Many PCJSS leaders criticized his arrest as a foolish mistake.
By September 1975, M.N. Larma had gone underground to lead the movement in secrecy. After trained guerrillas returned from India in 1976–77, armed resistance formally began and intensified. While Santu Larma was still imprisoned, a new chapter of armed resistance in the CHT was unfolding. He was arrested due to his own mistake at a critical time of all-out preparations for guerrilla war, and eventually became a tool of the Bangladesh ruling elites.
2.
As the armed struggle intensified, the government struggled to contain it. The Shanti Bahini grew to the strength of a brigade (at least 2,600 guerrillas), and the army suffered repeated setbacks. In response, Ziaur Rahman initiated a plan to settle Bengalis in the CHT. But when settlers were attacked by guerrillas, most of them fled in fear.
In this context, President Ziaur Rahman made a calculated move: on January 23, 1980, he used special executive powers to release Santu Larma and Chabai Marma. Zia believed that, in Santu's absence, new leadership had already emerged within PCJSS, so his release wouldn't pose a risk. In fact, Zia saw it as a strategic advantage.
Indian journalist Subir Bhaumik noted that this strategy worked. After his release, Santu distributed a 45-page document among party members, proposing that CHT issues could be resolved through socio-economic and cultural development. Shockingly, the same document had already been submitted to the Home Secretary—on the basis of which he was released. This caused deep resentment among Shanti Bahini members. Even M.N. Larma said, “Then he’s revealed all our secrets.”
After this betrayal, many PCJSS and Shanti Bahini leaders opposed Santu’s reintegration, but M.N. Larma brought him back anyway. Before leaving for India for treatment, M.N. Larma appointed Santu as acting chairman. Santu’s first move, after assuming his new role, was to stop attacks on Muslim settlers and dismantle the special task force led by Major Debjyoti Chakma, which had been created to resist settler expansion.
Santu also began spreading the idea that negotiations with the government would start soon, rendering armed struggle meaningless. He instructed guerrillas to move freely in public markets, demoralizing and confusing party members and slowing the movement. Soon, a bloody internal conflict within JSS erupted—eventually claiming M.N. Larma’s life.
Meanwhile, the government took advantage of the halt in attacks on settler villages, reinitiating their settlement program and consolidating army control. All this became possible because of Santu’s release—making him, for the second time, a tool for suppressing the movement.
3.
After winning the 1983–85 civil war, Santu Larma emerged as the uncontested leader of PCJSS. However, he failed to expand the movement or launch significant operations against the military, despite Indian aid. His armed struggle mostly targeted settler villages. This backfired when organized settlers and the military launched counter-attacks on indigenous villages, forcing many to flee to India and lose their ancestral lands—lands they haven’t recovered to this day.
A key question arises: Why did Santu first stop attacks on settlers after his release in 1980, only to resume them after winning the civil war? His ceasefire allowed settlers to organize and entrench themselves. Later, his ill-timed attacks gave settlers an excuse to retaliate, displacing indigenous people. Whether intentional or not, these decisions only benefited the government, military, and Bengali settlers.
Even after winning the civil war, Santu failed to revive the movement. In 1989, the government introduced local government councils (Zila Parishads) in three districts. Though JSS announced a boycott, elections were held anyway. Their failure to prevent the elections demoralized JSS. The army created "cluster villages" (essentially concentration camps) and used paramilitary groups to suppress the movement. Shanti Bahini members surrendered en masse. In short, under Santu’s leadership, the movement collapsed.
Against this backdrop, on May 20, 1989, the Hill Students’ Council (PCP) was born. It soon became the center of the political movement of the Jumma people. Massive student-led protests shook the hills, forcing the government and army into a defensive position. Only then did PCJSS find some breathing room.
As the student-led democratic movement gained momentum, pressure mounted on the government to resolve the CHT crisis politically. After Ershad’s dictatorship fell in 1990, the new government of Khaleda Zia began dialogue with PCJSS. Yet in a surprising speech on June 15, 1995, after meeting the government, Santu told the public: “You can’t achieve autonomy by slinging stones or waging militant movements.” This was an allusion to the Hill Students’ Council initiated movement. His words were seen as a betrayal of the hard-earned struggle.
Soon after, the army formed the Mukhosh Bahini, using it to attack PCP, the Hill People’s Council, and Hill Women’s Federation. Instead of using the students’ movement to gain leverage at the negotiating table, Santu moved to weaken and suppress it. Thus, for the third time, he became a tool of the ruling regime.
4.
After winning the 1996 elections, the Awami League signed the CHT Accord with PCJSS on December 2, 1997. PCJSS surrendered arms. However, instead of working to implement the Accord or continuing the movement, Santu Larma initiated a fratricidal conflict with the United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF). Over 27 years, this conflict has claimed around 600 lives and effectively derailed the Jumma peoples’ movement. UPDF repeatedly called for unity and offered joint struggle—but Santu rejected these overtures.
After 15 years of authoritarian rule, a mass uprising on July 5, 2024, overthrew the Awami League. The success of this movement inspired hill students, who formed the "Anti-Conflict and Anti-Discrimination Hill Student Movement." They organized major rallies in Khagrachari and Rangamati, with the potential to transform into a mass movement. For the first time in years, there was hope. But Santu Larma snuffed it out.
The students' core demands were: an end to the fratricidal conflict initiated by JSS (Santu faction), equal rights for all nationalities, full implementation of the CHT Accord, and indigenous recognition. The student movement reached out to all parties, including UPDF and JSS, for a united front.
Although the implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Accord and the recognition of indigenous peoples have long been key demands of the JSS (Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti), mysteriously, the student movement faced obstruction from the JSS (Santu faction) leadership. The JSS often claims that the continued fratricidal conflict in the CHT is due to the UPDF’s opposition to the Accord. However, despite their democratic criticisms, the UPDF has never actively obstructed the implementation of the Accord. On the contrary, in the broader interest of the movement, they pledged full support if students organized protests around these two demands.
Even though 99% of the hill people of the CHT, including the UPDF, united under the call of the ‘Anti-Conflict and Anti-Discrimination Hill Student Movement’ to demand the implementation of the Accord, Santu Larma and his group failed to respond. Instead of supporting the student movement, the faction led by Santu Larma sought to weaken it by creating obstacles. They threatened the coordinators of the student movement, disrupted the protests in various ways, and eventually, in collusion with the government, filed false cases against them and destroyed the movement. Without the collaboration of the JSS (Santu faction), the government or the military could never have suppressed the student protests. Earlier attempts by the military regime to incite violence through extremist settler groups in Dighinala, Khagrachari, and Rangamati also failed to quell the movement.
Fundamentally, due to the flawed political stance of the JSS, the "Anti-Conflict and Anti-Discrimination Hill Student Movement" could not emerge as a powerful force even in a promising period. Acting in favor of the military regime, the PCJSS directly obstructed the movement, and as a result, the opportunity for a large-scale student uprising in the CHT after the fall of the Hasina government was completely lost—due to the JSS (Santu) leaders. Thus, for the fourth time, Santu Larma became a tool in the hands of the ruling regime to suppress the Jumma people's movement.
In conclusion, although there have been several opportunities
for united movements in the CHT, they have repeatedly failed due to Santu
Larma. He has destroyed all prospects for unity-driven movements for his
personal interests. For this, history will never forgive him. However, Santu
Larma's era will not last forever. Just as even a crocodile eventually dies, so
too will Santu Larma fall. One day, the people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts
will undoubtedly unite and reclaim their rights through a collective movement.
(The End)
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