Opinion Report
At one time, Bangladesh's ruling class considered the
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) issue to be an economic and law-and-order problem.
In response, in 1976, Ziaur Rahman formed the Chittagong Hill Tracts
Development Board and deployed the military extensively in the region.
Additionally, in 1979, as part of a “counter-insurgency” strategy to suppress
the Shanti Bahini insurgency, he began settling people from the plains onto
indigenous lands in the hills. These actions did not resolve the issue;
instead, they greatly exacerbated it.
After Zia’s death, military ruler General Ershad also
initially tried to solve the CHT issue through military means. However, when
that failed, he took a political initiative and, in 1985, started the first
dialogue with the Jana Sanghati Samiti (JSS).
Following this, the government of Khaleda Zia, after
the 1990 mass uprising, also continued political dialogue. Eventually, after
the Awami League came to power following the 1996 elections, a peace accord was
signed on December 2, 1997, following multiple rounds of discussions.
While this accord raised hopes for peace, it contained
significant flaws. The United People's Democratic Front (UPDF) pointed out
these weaknesses and criticized the agreement. However, the parties to the
accord could not tolerate this valid criticism from the UPDF. As a result, a
severe crackdown was launched against the UPDF. Yet, by criticizing the accord,
the UPDF did not commit any crime or wrongdoing. They were merely exercising
their constitutional right to freedom of expression. Despite this, the UPDF
came under intense attack—on one side from the Bangladesh government, and on
the other from the JSS. There’s no room here to elaborate on that in full, but
it is enough to say that to understand the current situation in the CHT, one
must understand how repression of the UPDF began after the accord.
At present, everyone acknowledges and agrees that the
CHT problem is a political one. Even military officials admit this. The current
instability and unrest in the region clearly show that the 1997 Peace Accord
has failed to provide a genuine political solution to the problem. In reality,
the current situation in the CHT is a result of the inherent weaknesses of the
accord and the undemocratic, fascist mindset of its signatories. The people of
this country have deeply experienced the consequences of such lack of democracy
and rise of fascism. These fascists—whether military or civilian—ultimately
cause irreparable harm to themselves, society, and the nation.
If the CHT problem is political, then logically, it
should be resolved politically. But over the past 27 years, we have not seen
such political initiatives. Instead, since the signing of the accord, there has
been a fascist-style use of force to suppress so-called “opponents of the
accord.” Both signatory parties to the accord have united in this repression.
The government aimed to prevent any new movement from emerging among the hill
people. On the other hand, the JSS believed that it alone represented the
legitimate voice of the Jumma (hill) people. Therefore, it opposed the
formation of any other political party among them. As a result, we saw that
both the then-Awami League government and the JSS had common goals and
strategies concerning the UPDF after the accord.
Though the Awami League is no longer in power, its
policy on the CHT remains unchanged. The Hasina government had effectively
leased the region to the military, and the current Yunus government has not
revoked or been able to revoke that lease. The real governing authority in the
CHT does not lie with the political leadership in Dhaka but with the military
officers stationed there. They control everything in the hills and have been
attempting for the past 27 years to solve this political problem through military
means. As part of their mission to eliminate or destroy the UPDF, armed
vigilante groups are active in the hills—much like in other districts of the
country—even though there is no insurgency here. Despite facing extreme
repression, the UPDF has not turned to armed struggle or insurgency. Instead,
they have continued their movement through democratic means and have allied
with other progressive parties and organizations in the country. However,
military officials in the CHT are responding to this democratic movement with
counter-insurgency tactics. It's like trying to cure jaundice by performing eye
surgery simply because the patient has yellow eyes. This is the root cause of
the current problems in the CHT.
But we know that when a disease is diagnosed, it
should be treated accordingly. If the CHT problem is political, it must be
resolved through political means. Any attempt to solve a political issue
militarily is bound to fail, as it has in the past. Therefore, if we truly want
to establish peace in the CHT, we cannot leave the solution solely in the hands
of generals who only know left-right maneuvers. They must be brought fully
under civilian political leadership, and a political initiative must be taken.
There is no alternative to a political solution for the CHT problem.
(October 16, 2025)
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